tivity problem, favorable circumstances remain exposed to the reiteration of the selectivity problem against the causal compound made of motivation *plus* favorable conditions. That is to say, there may be people who do not self-deceive, even if they have the motivation and are *also* put in favorable circumstances. It may be true that the motivation to believe that *p*, coupled with circumstances of hard pressure, can increase the probability that one ends up self-deceiving. This may happen because pressure can erode the possible resistance that the subject, under less pressure, might still exert over the motivational thrust. If this is correct, then there must be something causally relevant in pressure, if a smaller number of motivated people resist against pressure. Yet, the addition of pressure as a means to making motivation stronger can't hardly be the end of the causal story, given that selectivity is still looming. Resistance to motivation and pressure thus seems to depend more on the psychological structure of the subject than on any other circumstances. Simply put, some people have a psychological structure that make them more resistant than others to various level of motivation and pressure. Even if we include the psychological structure of the subject in our causal analysis, it may be hard to adjudicate the question whether the psychology of the subject is causally decisive. Is the kind of psychological one has that is the *ultimate* determinant of self-deception? Or is it the vector computed by combining motivation and pressure with the psychological structure of the subject? This is a metaphysical topic for another, wider piece. But I think it is important to emphasize that there is a genuine issue here, which is urgent to adjudicate.

In all, this is a beautifully written, and excellently argued, book that by all means should become a must-read for a wide audience, including (although not limited to) students and scholars interested in political philosophy, international relations, social and political sciences, philosophy of mind and psychology, ethics, as well as all those who are active in policy making.

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McCarroll, Christopher J., *Remembering from the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind.*
New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. xx + 220.

The theme of observer memory might strike one who hasn't read McCarroll's book as somewhat narrow or specialized. Anyone who has read the book, however, will understand that it in fact intersects with a wide range of issues in the philosophy of memory and beyond. The book is thoroughly researched, rigorously argued, and might be read with profit by philosophers working not only on memory but also on perception, imagination, and language. It might also profitably be read by psychologists working on any of these topics, for McCarroll both displays an impressive mastery of the relevant empirical literature and makes use of philosophical tools to shed considerable new light on the conceptual puzzles to which it gives rise.

In field perspective memory (FPM), one remembers an event from the point of view from which one originally experienced it; in observer perspective memory (OPM), in contrast, one remembers an event from a point of view other than that from which one originally experienced it, seeing oneself in the remem-

bered scene. The central question of the book is whether OPMs can be fully genuine or faithful to the past. McCarroll claims—in opposition to a claim found throughout the philosophical and psychological literatures—that it can be, and this in a very precise sense. We can distinguish between the truth of a retrieved memory and its authenticity (Bernecker 2008):[1] a memory is true if it is accurate with respect to the remembered event; it is authentic if it is accurate with respect to the subject's experience of the remembered event. What McCarroll claims is that OPMs can be both true and authentic.

The claim that OPMs can be true is unproblematic: one's memory of an event might clearly be accurate with respect to the event even if the point of view from which one remembers it differs from the point of view from which one experienced it. It is the claim—and McCarroll makes it clear that he does indeed mean to defend this claim—that OPMs can be authentic that is surprising. How, given that one did not see oneself while experiencing the event, might a memory in which one sees oneself be accurate with respect to one's experience of the event? (Compare two photos, taken from different angles, of the same scene: they might both match the scene, but they will not match each other.) After reviewing the literature on OPM in chapter 1, McCarroll develops, in chapters 2 and 3, a two-part framework designed in part to answer this question. The framework combines a "constructive encoding" approach and a "reconstructive retrieval" approach. The basic idea behind the former is that constructive processes occurring during encoding may shape the content of a stored memory. The basic idea behind the latter is that reconstructive processes occurring during retrieval may shape the content of a retrieved memory. Both of these ideas are empirically well-established, but the way in which McCarroll builds on them to defend the claim that OPMs can be authentic is highly original.

According to the reconstructive retrieval approach, the new content that figures in an OPM—including a visual representation of the rememberer himself—is sometimes the product of reconstruction at retrieval. This approach thus does not by itself imply that OPMs can be authentic. According to the constructive encoding approach, the apparently new content that figures in an OPM is sometimes the product of construction at encoding; the apparently new content may, in other words, not be new at all. This approach thus implies that OPMs can be authentic: the problematic components of the content of an OPM, including, in particular, the visual representation of the rememberer himself, may, in some cases, have figured in the corresponding earlier experiences. In short, there is an important sense in which one does sometimes see oneself while experiencing an event, a sense in which one sometimes has "observer perspective experiences" (OPEs).

The notion of an OPE is both the most provocative and the most problematic element of McCarroll's book. He emphasizes that he is not interested in what we might call literal OPEs, experiences in which one literally entertains a visual representation of oneself while experiencing an event (e.g., by visually imagining oneself from a hypothetical observer's point of view). Thus his claim is not that an OPM might be authentic because the apparently new content that figures in it figured, in the same, visual form, in the corresponding OPE. It is, instead, that an OPM might be authentic because the apparently new content that figures in it figured, in a different, nonvisual form, in the OPE. This entails

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[1] Bernecker, S. 2008, *The Metaphysics of Memory*, Netherlands: Springer.

that the content of a nonliteral OPE can be equivalent to the content of a literal OPM, and McCarroll goes to considerable effort to show that this is the case, arguing that experience has a multimodal character and that information in one modality might be "translated" into another. When giving a public talk, for example, one experiences the scene from one's own visual point of view, but one might (say, if one is feeling self-conscious) also experience it from an emotional observer point of view; this emotional content can then be translated, during encoding, into a visual representation of one's self.

McCarroll's strategy here is ingenuous. It does, however, face two obvious problems. First, the notion of an OPE is highly speculative. McCarroll borrows the notion from Nigro and Neisser's foundational (1983) paper.[2] Nigro and Neisser do not, however, provide any real evidence for the occurrence of OPEs, and the concept of an OPE has played no role in subsequent research on OPM. McCarroll does point to evidence from a variety of sources suggesting that the self may be present in experience in a variety of (nonvisual) ways, but this evidence falls short of indicating that ordinary experiences may include content of the required sort. Second, the notion of translation is likewise highly speculative. The claim about authenticity presupposes not only that a nonvisual representation of the self may, via the translation process, give rise to a visual representation of the self, but also that it may do so without generating new content, for, if a retrieved memory includes content that was not included in the experience, it is by definition inauthentic. McCarroll does point to evidence suggesting that information in one modality can be translated into another modality; this evidence does not, however, indicate that a nonvisual representation can be translated into a visual representation without the addition of new content.

In order to surmount these problems, McCarroll might relax the standard of authenticity so as to allow a memory to be authentic as long as it includes at most a moderate amount of new content. Once the standard is relaxed, however, it becomes hard to see why we should care about it at all: if genuine memory is compatible with the addition of a moderate amount of new content, why think that it is incompatible with the addition of a large amount of new content? Two further moves suggest themselves. First, McCarroll might weaken the concept of OPM: if the OPMs in which he is interested are not literal OPMs—i.e., if they do not include visual representations of the self but only, say, emotional representations of the self—the authenticity claim becomes much more plausible. Second, he might strengthen the concept of OPE: if the OPEs in which he is interested are literal OPEs—i.e., if they do include visual representations of the self—then the authenticity claim again becomes much more plausible. The cost of making either of these moves is, however, a significant reduction in the interest of the authenticity claim. The claim that literal OPMs can be authentic with respect to literal OPEs and the claim that nonliteral OPMs can be authentic with respect to nonliteral OPEs are much less surprising than the claim that literal OPMs can be authentic with respect to nonliteral OPEs.

There may, of course, be further moves that are open to McCarroll. The intention of these remarks is not to show that his argument does not succeed but simply to show that there are ways of pushing back against it. And if it should eventually turn out that the argument does not succeed, McCarroll will never-

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[2] Nigro, G. and Neisser, U. 1983, "Point of View in Personal Memories", *Cognitive Psychology*, 15, 4, 467-82.

theless have enabled us to learn a great deal about the nature and limits of memory's faithfulness to the past; this alone is sufficient to ensure that his book will stand as a major contribution to the philosophy of memory.

McCarroll's argument for the authenticity claim will be of interest not only to philosophers of memory but also to philosophers of perception. Subsequent chapters will be of interest to philosophers working on topics including imagination and language. Chapters 4 and 5 engage critically with Vendler's (1979)[3] claim that imagining "from the outside" is just a special case of imagining "from the inside", arguing that Vendler goes wrong by overlooking the possibility of an unoccupied point of view in visual imagery. Chapter 6 engages critically with François Recanati's work, arguing that Recanati's (2007) framework[4] can be modified so as to accommodate a form of implicit *de se* thought that is both first-personal and from-the-outside. Chapter 7 of the book brings things to a conclusion by drawing together the various threads of the overall argument.

The quantity of published philosophical work on memory has increased rapidly over the past few years. Much of this work is of the highest quality. Even against this background, however, McCarroll's book stands out as one of the most important contributions to the area in many years. The publication of the book is a major event in the philosophy of memory. I look forward to engaging with it in my own future work, and I have no doubt that many others will as well.[5]

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Mendelovici, Angela, *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. xviii + 275.

What is the deep nature of intentionality? What is its source? What relation is there between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness? These are some of the main questions addressed by Angela Mendelovici in her recent, well written and original book *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*. Mendelovici's proposal, as the title of her book clearly suggests, belongs to that family of theories that take a "consciousness-first" approach to intentionality. Such an approach is endorsed by all the advocates of the so called "Phenomenal Intentionality Theory" (PIT) (people like Loar, Searle, Siewert, Strawson, Kriegel, Horgan, Tienson, Pitt, Farkas, Chalmers, Smithies, Montague, to mention just a few of them). For PIT's friends, intentionality has an experiential-phenomenal nature and has its source in phenomenal consciousness. According to Mendelovici, this is so because intentionality is phenomenal consciousness, in the sense that intentionali-