

Chapter 1 1

Dreaming and Memory: Editors' 2

Introduction 3

Daniel Gregory and Kourken Michaelian 4

1.1 The Rationale for the Book 5

Nothing can be understood in isolation. Even the most fundamental things—the chemical elements, the natural numbers, the very laws of nature—only make sense to us in context. Understanding anything requires understanding its relationship to other things. It can therefore be a fruitful research methodology to identify two independently interesting phenomena that seem like they might also bear interesting relationships to one another and to investigate them together. The motivating impulse for this project is the suspicion that dreaming and memory—two intriguing, even mysterious mental states—might profitably be investigated in tandem. 6
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What are the potential benefits for our understanding of memory? As a field, the philosophy of memory has matured considerably over the last several years, but debate has focussed to a large extent on memory for ordinary perceptual experiences. An adequate theory of remembering, however, must apply to memories of all kinds, and we can expect to improve our understanding of memory in general by investigating how theories apply to memories of particular kinds. Because dreaming is a highly distinctive mental state, looking at what is involved in remembering dreams is an especially promising step in this project. Exploring the question of what is involved in memory for dreams will cast new light on the nature of memory itself. 14
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24 What are the potential benefits for our understanding of dreaming? It is some-
25 what ironic that, while we generally experience dreams as taking place in the pres-
26 ent, our understanding of dreams largely depends on our waking memories of them.
27 Those interested in dreams should want to understand what this implies. Other
28 intriguing questions include whether we have a sense of the past at all during dreams
29 (and what this would mean) and whether it is possible to remember something
30 within a dream. Answering these questions will advance our understanding of
31 dreams themselves.

32 There are other ways in which we can hope to advance our understanding of both
33 memory and dreaming by studying them alongside one another. In addition, the
34 exercise of comparing and contrasting them promises to cast light on other issues.
35 We might reasonably hope to learn about the features that are involved in both
36 dreaming and memory—such as sensory experience and perspective-taking—by
37 considering how these features are manifested and what role they play in the context
38 of each mental state.

39 **1.2 The Content of the Book**

40 The contributions to this volume are organized into three parts: Part I is on
41 Remembering Dreams; Part II is on Remembering Within Dreams; Part III is on
42 Dreaming vs. Remembering.

43 **1.2.1 Remembering Dreams**

44 One natural starting point for philosophers, when asked to consider dreaming and
45 memory in connection with each other, is to ask what is involved in remembering
46 dreams—or, indeed, if it is even possible to remember dreams. The seven chapters
47 in part I of the book approach the issue in a wide variety of ways.

48 **Copenhaver** is concerned with two questions. First, do dreams acquaint you
49 with the objects and events that they represent? She focusses, in answering this
50 question, on the case of dreams of objects and events that you have experienced
51 previously. Second, does a memory experience of a dream that represented objects
52 and events that you had actually experienced during wakefulness renew acquaint-
53 ance with those original objects and events? Developing what she calls “an inten-
54 tionalist, direct realist, acquaintance account”, she defends negative answers to both
55 of these questions.

56 **Rosen** appeals to the fact that memory seems to be badly compromised during
57 dreams to argue that many dreams may not be conscious experiences at all. On some
58 theories of consciousness, momentary retention in working memory is at least part
59 of what makes a mental state a conscious experience. Insofar as memory generally
60 is diminished in various respects during dreams, it may be that the experiences in

most dreams are not actually retained in working memory for long enough to enter consciousness at all. This “weak scepticism” about dreams is a revised and updated version of the more thoroughgoing scepticism about dream experiences previously advanced by Malcolm (1956, 1959) and Dennett (1976).

Sant’Anna begins by arguing that what he refers to as the “asymmetry problem” for accounts of dream experience—a problem that arises because reports of dreams are based on introspection on dream memories, whereas reports of waking experiences are based on introspection on the experiences themselves—means that attempts to compare dreaming to forms of waking experience may be misleading. He goes on to argue that attending to the role of metacognition in enabling us to distinguish between memories of dreams and memories of waking experiences provides a means of overcoming this problem. He argues, moreover, that this suggests that dreaming should be understood neither as a form of perceptual experience nor as a form of imagination but rather as a form of mind-wandering.

Demšar and Windt point out that, because empirical dream research inevitably relies on dream reports provided by individuals, it is critically dependent on individuals’ memories of their dreams. This, they observe, creates a major challenge for researchers, insofar as dream recall is notoriously fickle. They nonetheless identify certain best-practice guidelines for dream research to mitigate this problem. They also note that dream research has tended to focus on the content, rather than the phenomenology, of dreams. They suggest that two methods which have been applied in investigating conscious experience during wakefulness—Descriptive Experience Sampling and Micro-Phenomenological Interviewing—could be implemented to investigate dream phenomenology in a manner consistent with the best-practice guidelines.

Werning and Liefke oppose both representationalism and relationalism about memory, which disagree in part over whether memory reports should be understood as *de dicto* or *de re*, arguing that neither view can accommodate memories for dreams or hallucinations, in which factivity is violated. Appealing to the notion of referential parasitism—the idea that reference in memory is parasitic on reference in the original experience—they argue that memory reports should be understood neither as *de dicto* nor as *de re* but rather as *de hospite* and provide a detailed *de hospite* analysis of memory reports. Finally, linking their analysis to recent discussion of whether memory traces have representational content, they argue that referential parasitism suggests that traces are contentless rather than contentful, in line with the minimal trace theory of memory (Werning, 2020).

Michaelian, intervening in an ongoing debate over the nature of accuracy in memory, in which some philosophers have held that it is a matter of “truth”, defined as accuracy with respect to the original event, while others have maintained that it is a matter of “authenticity”, defined as accuracy with respect to the subject’s original experience (Bernecker, 2009), argues that, when we attempt to apply the notions of truth and authenticity to memory for dreams, as opposed to memory for more ordinary experiences, we see that neither of these notions is appropriate. Instead, he suggests, accuracy in memory—whether for dreams or otherwise—is a matter of

105 “faithfulness”, defined simply as accuracy with respect to the intentional object of
 106 the subject’s experience.

107 **McCarroll, Wang, and Lin**, seeking to defend the view that accuracy in mem-
 108 ory requires authenticity, begin by arguing for “attitudinal pluralism” about dream-
 109 ing, the view that the dream self, as opposed to the dreamer, can adopt a variety of
 110 attitudes within the dream. They go on to argue that the attitudes in question are part
 111 of the content of the dream, as opposed to its phenomenology, and draw the conclu-
 112 sion that accurately remembering a dream involves recalling the attitudes that one
 113 adopted while dreaming. This, they claim, demonstrates that, at least in the case of
 114 memory for dreams, accuracy in memory requires authenticity.

115 *1.2.2 Remembering Within Dreams*

116 The question whether it is possible to have memories during dreams receives atten-
 117 tion in a number of papers throughout the volume. Copenhaver, for example, dis-
 118 cusses whether a dream corresponding to a past experience can renew acquaintance
 119 with the events and objects that featured in that original experience. The two papers
 120 in part II, however, are dedicated to the topic of memory within dreams.

121 **James** argues that—despite the detachment from the external world that is char-
 122 acteristic of dreaming—when one dreams, one is sometimes related to objects in the
 123 external world. He argues, moreover, that the relation in question is that of memory,
 124 in the sense that, when one dreams, one sometimes remembers objects in the exter-
 125 nal world. After reviewing problems for existing accounts of the sort of memory in
 126 question (e.g., Openshaw, 2022), he provides a novel account in terms of what he
 127 refers to as “distinguishing objectual knowledge”, where having distinguishing
 128 objectual knowledge is a matter of being able to distinguish an object from relevant
 129 alternatives.

130 **Gregory** approaches the question whether it is possible to have episodic memo-
 131 ries during non-lucid dreams by asking whether it is possible for dream experiences
 132 to satisfy Debus’s “modified epistemic relevance condition”. This condition stipu-
 133 lates that an experience only qualifies as a (paradigmatic) episodic memory if,
 134 among other things, “the subject [is] disposed to take the relevant experience into
 135 account when judging about the past” (Debus, 2010: 25). Gregory focuses on three
 136 key notions that figure in the modified epistemic relevance condition: “judgment”,
 137 “being disposed to take into account”, and “the past”. He argues that each of these
 138 notions presents an obstacle to concluding that a dream experience could be an
 139 episodic memory.

1.2.3 Remembering and Dreaming Compared

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The chapters in Parts I and II all investigate whether and how one of the two mental states can be an object or a part of the other: whether and how we can remember dreams, and whether and how we can have memories within dreams. The six chapters making up Part III take a comparative approach, looking at the two mental states alongside one another, as it were, and tracing their similarities, differences, and relationships.

Bernecker notes that both dreams and memories involve mental imagery and asks what distinguishes between “dream imaginings” and “memory imaginings”. After adopting a focus on the features of each type of imagining that are accessible to the imagining subject, he starts from Urmsen’s (1967) proposal that what distinguishes remembering from imagining is the criterion of success that the subject applies in each case and, adopting an externalist interpretation of that proposal, argues that a state of imagining qualifies as remembering if it is produced by a mechanism whose proper function is to track the truth.

Soteriou’s topic is perspective-taking. It is possible, while we are awake, to occupy a particular spatiotemporal perspective and, simultaneously, to represent another one. This happens when we have experiential memories and it can happen when we imagine. We can remember being somewhere other than our present location at a certain point in the past, and we can imagine being somewhere other than our present location at a certain point in the past or in the future. In both cases, we still occupy a spatiotemporal perspective; we still situate ourselves, as it were, in the environment in which we are located at the present time. Soteriou argues that things are different in dreams. Usually, when we are dreaming, we represent a spatiotemporal perspective without actually occupying a spatiotemporal perspective. We represent (and *seem* to occupy) a perspective vis-à-vis dreamt-of events and objects, but we are oblivious to our actual environment (and thus do not *actually* occupy a spatiotemporal perspective). He holds that this is central to understanding certain characteristic features of dreams.

Barkasi points out that, while there is widespread agreement that remembering involves a feeling of pastness, there is much less agreement on the nature of this feeling. Starting from the insight that the feeling of pastness is involved not only in remembering but also in temporally shifting dreams, he argues that we can better understand the nature of the feeling of pastness by considering its distinct roles in memory and dreaming. Barkasi’s detailed phenomenological analysis leads him to the conclusion that the feeling arises through the interaction between the subject’s experience of time and the temporal structure of the subject’s experience itself.

Sutton provides an important historical perspective, focussing on work by Maurice Halbwachs, a French philosopher and sociologist of the first half of the twentieth century. Drawing on the first full English translation of Halbwachs’ influential 1925 work, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (*The Social Frameworks of Memory*), which is near completion and due to be published in 2023, he offers a detailed treatment of the first two chapters of the book—almost entirely omitted

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183 from the only existing translation—which involve an extended comparison of
 184 dreaming and memory. He argues that Halbwachs was a much subtler and more
 185 sophisticated thinker about both mental states than has been recognised in existing
 186 scholarship on his work. He also shows how Halbwachs’ work both foreshadows
 187 and remains relevant to contemporary work in dream research.

188 **Dranseika**’s contribution is within the realm of experimental philosophy. He
 189 presents results of a series of studies of folk beliefs about the phenomenological
 190 similarities and differences between dreaming, remembering, perceiving, imagin-
 191 ing, and hallucinating. The data will be useful for anyone seeking to understand any
 192 of these mental states in terms of one of the others—for example, for researchers
 193 who have sought to understand either dreaming or remembering in terms of
 194 imagining.

195 **Macpherson** sets out a novel theory of hallucination and illusion and then
 196 applies that theory to analyze dreams which seem to involve perceptual elements.
 197 Her theory explains how it is possible to dream of an object but attribute to it a
 198 property that you are actually perceiving and to perceive an object but attribute to it
 199 a property that you are actually dreaming. She then notes that her theory allows that
 200 one could have a dream involving representation of a sensory property that one has
 201 not previously experienced. This would happen if one had a dream incorporating
 202 actual perception of such a sensory property. She develops this into a challenge for
 203 Hume’s memory-reliant theory of sensory imagination, on which sensory images
 204 are always developed from faint copies of sensory experiences stored in memory.

205 1.3 Final Remarks

206 Virtually all of the contributors to this volume had expertise in dreaming or memory
 207 but not both. We made clear, when inviting contributors, that their chapters would
 208 have to speak to both topics and that they would thus have to venture beyond their
 209 usual areas of research. This was not a small thing to ask, particularly given the
 210 pressure in modern academic life to specialize in ever narrower topics (something
 211 which, we note in passing, is an obstacle to the comparative research methodology
 212 described above). We thank the contributors for taking up this difficult and demand-
 213 ing task and carrying it out with aplomb.

214 The reader who works through every chapter in this volume will find that some
 215 are distinct from the others in terms of methodology. Sutton’s chapter is exegetic;
 216 Dranseika’s methodology is experimental; Werning and Liefke apply formal techni-
 217 ques. A couple of authors draw on records of their own dream experiences. We
 218 believe that this enriches the volume, providing a sense of the wide range of direc-
 219 tions in which research on the relationship between dreaming and memory might be
 220 pursued.

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