

Dreaming and Memory: Editors' Introduction

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1 The Rationale for the Book

Nothing can be understood in isolation. Even the most fundamental things—the chemical elements, the natural numbers, the very laws of nature—only make sense to us in context. Understanding anything requires understanding its relationship to other things. It can therefore be a fruitful research methodology to identify two independently interesting phenomena that seem like they might also bear interesting relationships to one another and to investigate them together. The motivating impulse for this project is the suspicion that dreaming and memory—two intriguing, even mysterious mental states—might profitably be investigated in tandem.

What are the potential benefits for our understanding of memory? As a field, the philosophy of memory has matured considerably over the last several years, but debate has focussed to a large extent on memory for ordinary perceptual experiences. An adequate theory of remembering, however, must apply to memories of all kinds, and we can expect to improve our understanding of memory in general by investigating how theories apply to memories of particular kinds. Because dreaming is a highly distinctive mental state, looking at what is involved in remembering dreams is an especially promising step in this project. Exploring the question of what is involved in memory for dreams will cast new light on the nature of memory itself.

What are the potential benefits for our understanding of dreaming? It is somewhat ironic that, while we generally experience dreams as taking place in the present, our understanding of dreams inevitably depends on our waking memories of them. Those interested in dreams should want to understand what this implies. Empirical researchers have to deal with the challenge that recollection of dreams is, in many instances, poor, but there is also a broader philosophical question: what are we actually trying to understand—dreams themselves or merely recollections and reports of them? There are further intriguing questions here, such as whether we have a sense of the past during dreams (and what this would mean) and whether it is possible to remember within a dream.

There are other ways in which we can hope to advance our understanding of both memory and dreaming by studying them alongside one another. In addition, the exercise of comparing and contrasting them promises to cast light on other issues. We might reasonably hope to learn about the features that are involved in both dreaming and memory—such as sensory experience and perspective-taking—by considering how these features are manifested and what role they play in the context of each mental state.

2 The Content of the Book

The contributions to this volume are organized into three parts: part I is on Remembering Dreams; part II is on Remembering Within Dreams; part III is on Dreaming vs. Remembering.

2.1 Remembering Dreams

One natural starting point for philosophers, when asked to consider dreaming and memory in connection with each other, is to ask what is involved in remembering dreams—or, indeed, if it is even possible to remember dreams. The seven chapters in part I of the book approach the issue in a wide variety of ways.

Copenhaver is concerned with two questions. First, do dreams acquaint you with the objects and events that they represent? She focusses, in answering this question, on the case of dreams of objects and events that you have experienced previously. Second, does a memory experience of a dream that represented objects and events that you had actually experienced during wakefulness renew acquaintance with those original objects and events? Developing what she calls “an intentionalist, direct realist, acquaintance account”, she defends negative answers to both of these questions.

Rosen appeals to the fact that memory seems to be badly compromised during dreams to argue that many dreams may not be conscious experiences at all. On some theories of consciousness, momentary retention in working memory is at least part of what makes a mental state a conscious experience. Insofar as memory generally is diminished in various respects during dreams, it may be that the experiences in most dreams are not actually retained in working memory for long enough to enter consciousness at all. This “weak scepticism” about dreams is a revised and updated version of the more thoroughgoing scepticism about dream experiences previously advanced by Malcolm (1956, 1959) and Dennett (1976).

Sant’Anna begins by arguing that what he refers to as the “asymmetry problem” for accounts of dream experience—a problem that arises because reports of dreams are based on introspection on dream memories, whereas reports of waking experiences are based on introspection on the experiences themselves—means that attempts to compare dreaming to forms of waking experience may be misleading. He goes on to argue that attending to the role of metacognition in enabling us to distinguish between memories of dreams and memories of waking experiences provides a means of overcoming this problem. He argues, moreover, that this suggests that dreaming should be understood neither as a form of perceptual experience nor as a form of imagination but rather as a form of mind-wandering.

Demšar & Windt point out that, because empirical dream research inevitably relies on dream reports provided by individuals, it is critically dependent on individuals’ memories of their dreams. This, they observe, creates a major challenge for researchers, insofar as dream recall is notoriously fickle. They nonetheless identify certain best-practice guidelines for dream research to mitigate this problem. They also note that dream research has tended to focus on the content, rather than the phenomenology, of dreams. They suggest that two methods which have been applied in investigating conscious experience during wakefulness—Descriptive Experience Sampling and Micro-Phenomenological Interviewing—could be implemented to investigate dream phenomenology in a manner consistent with the best-practice guidelines.

Werning and Liefke oppose both representationalism and relationalism about memory, which disagree in part over whether memory reports should be understood as *de dicto* or *de re*, arguing that neither view can accommodate memories for dreams or hallucinations, in which factivity is violated. Appealing to the notion of referential parasitism—the idea that reference in memory is parasitic on reference in the original experience—they argue that memory reports should be understood neither as *de dicto* nor as *de re* but rather as *de hospite* and provide a detailed *de hospite* analysis of memory reports. Finally, linking their analysis to recent discussion of whether memory traces have representational content, they argue that referential parasitism suggests that traces are contentless rather than contentful, in line with the minimal trace theory of memory (Werning 2020).

Michaelian, intervening in an ongoing debate over the nature of accuracy in memory, in which some philosophers have held that it is a matter of “truth”, defined as accuracy with respect to the original event, while others have maintained that it is a matter of “authenticity”,

defined as accuracy with respect to the subject's original experience (Bernecker 2010), argues that, when we attempt to apply the notions of truth and authenticity to memory for dreams, as opposed to memory for more ordinary experiences, we see that neither of these notions is appropriate. Instead, he suggests, accuracy in memory—whether for dreams or otherwise—is a matter of “faithfulness”, defined simply as accuracy with respect to the intentional object of the subject's experience.

McCarroll, Wang, and Lin, seeking to defend the view that accuracy in memory requires authenticity, begin by arguing for “attitudinal pluralism” about dreaming, the view that the dream self, as opposed to the dreamer, can adopt a variety of attitudes within the dream. They go on to argue that the attitudes in question are part of the content of the dream, as opposed to its phenomenology, and draw the conclusion that accurately remembering a dream involves recalling the attitudes that one adopted while dreaming. This, they claim, demonstrates that, at least in the case of memory for dreams, accuracy in memory requires authenticity.

2.2 Remembering Within Dreams

The question whether it is possible to have memories during dreams receives attention in a number of papers throughout the volume. Copenhaver, for example, discusses whether a dream corresponding to a past experience can renew acquaintance with the events and objects that featured in that original experience. The two papers in part II, however, are dedicated to the topic of memory within dreams.

James argues that—despite the detachment from the external world that is characteristic of dreaming—when one dreams, one is sometimes related to objects in the external world. He argues, moreover, that the relation in question is that of memory, in the sense that, when one dreams, one sometimes remembers objects in the external world. After reviewing problems for existing accounts of the sort of memory in question (e.g., Openshaw 2022), he provides a novel account in terms of what he refers to as “distinguishing objectual knowledge”, where having distinguishing objectual knowledge is a matter of being able to distinguish an object from relevant alternatives.

Gregory approaches the question whether it is possible to have episodic memories during non-lucid dreams by asking whether it is possible for dream experiences to satisfy Debus's “modified epistemic relevance condition”. This condition stipulates that an experience only qualifies as a (paradigmatic) episodic memory if, among other things, “the subject [is] disposed to take the relevant experience into account when judging about the past” (Debus 2010: 25). Gregory focuses on three key notions that figure in the modified epistemic relevance condition: “judgment”, “being disposed to take into account”, and “the past”. He argues that each of these notions presents an obstacle to concluding that a dream experience could be an episodic memory.

2.3 Remembering vs. Dreaming

The chapters in parts I and II all investigate whether and how one of the two mental states can be an object or a part of the other: whether and how we can remember dreams, and whether and how we can have memories within dreams. The six chapters making up part III take a comparative approach, looking at the two mental states alongside one another, as it were, and tracing their similarities, differences, and relationships.

Bernecker notes that both dreams and memories involve mental imagery and asks what distinguishes between “dream imaginings” and “memory imaginings”. After adopting a focus on the features of each type of imagining that are accessible to the imagining subject, he starts from Urmsen's (1967) proposal that what distinguishes remembering from imagining is the criterion of success that the subject applies in each case and, adopting an externalist

interpretation of that proposal, argues that a state of imagining qualifies as remembering if it is produced by a mechanism whose proper function is to track the truth.

Soteriou's topic is perspective-taking. It is possible, while we are awake, to occupy a particular spatiotemporal perspective and, simultaneously, to represent another one. This happens when we have experiential memories and it can happen when we imagine. We can remember being somewhere other than our present location at a certain point in the past, and we can imagine being somewhere other than our present location at a certain point in the past or in the future. In both cases, we still occupy a spatiotemporal perspective: we still situate ourselves, as it were, in the environment in which we are located at the present time. Soteriou argues that things are different in dreams. Usually, when we are dreaming, we represent a spatiotemporal perspective without actually occupying a spatiotemporal perspective. We represent (and *seem* to occupy) a perspective vis-à-vis dreamt-of events and objects, but we are oblivious to our actual environment (and thus do not *actually* occupy a spatiotemporal perspective). He holds that this is central to understanding certain characteristic features of dreams.

Barkasi points out that, while there is widespread agreement that remembering involves a feeling of pastness, there is much less agreement on the nature of this feeling. Starting from the insight that the feeling of pastness is involved not only in remembering but also in temporally shifting dreams, he argues that we can better understand the nature of the feeling of pastness by considering its distinct roles in memory and dreaming. Barkasi's detailed phenomenological analysis leads him to the conclusion that the feeling arises through the interaction between the subject's experience of time and the temporal structure of the subject's experience itself.

Sutton provides an important historical perspective, focussing on work by Maurice Halbwachs, a French philosopher and sociologist of the first half of the twentieth century. Drawing on the first full English translation of Halbwachs' influential 1925 work, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (*The Social Frameworks of Memory*), which is near completion and due to be published in 2023, he offers a detailed treatment of the first two chapters of the book—almost entirely omitted from the only existing translation—which involve an extended comparison of dreaming and memory. He argues that Halbwachs was a much subtler and more sophisticated thinker about both mental states than has been recognised in existing scholarship on his work. He also shows how Halbwachs' work both foreshadows and remains relevant to contemporary work in dream research.

Dranseika's contribution is within the realm of experimental philosophy. He presents results of a series of studies of folk beliefs about the phenomenological similarities and differences between dreaming, remembering, perceiving, imagining, and hallucinating. The data will be useful for anyone seeking to understand any of these mental states in terms of one of the others—for example, for researchers who have sought to understand either dreaming or remembering in terms of imagining.

Macpherson sets out a novel theory of hallucination and illusion and then applies that theory to analyze dreams which seem to involve perceptual elements. Her theory explains how it is possible to dream of an object but attribute to it a property that you are actually perceiving and to perceive an object but attribute to it a property that you are actually dreaming. She then notes that her theory allows that one could have a dream involving representation of a sensory property that one has not previously experienced. This would happen if one had a dream incorporating actual perception of such a sensory property. She develops this into a challenge for Hume's memory-reliant theory of sensory imagination, on which sensory images are always developed from faint copies of sensory experiences stored in memory.

3 Final Remarks

Virtually all of the contributors to this volume had expertise in dreaming or memory but not both. We made clear, when inviting contributors, that their chapters would have to speak to both topics and that they would thus have to venture beyond their usual areas of research. This was not a small thing to ask, particularly given the pressure in modern academic life to specialize in ever narrower topics (something which, we note in passing, is an obstacle to the comparative research methodology described above). We thank the contributors for taking up this difficult and demanding task and carrying it out with aplomb.

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